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ABSTRACT                                                                                           
Heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (HWSNET) are more suitable for real life applications as 
compared to the homogeneous counterpart. Security of HWSNET becomes a very important issue with the 
rapid development of HWSNET. Intrusion detection system is one of the major and efficient defensive 
methods against attacks in HWSNET. Because of different constraints of sensor networks, security 
solutions have to be designed with limited usage of computation and resources. A particularly devastating 
attack is the sleep deprivation attack. Here a malicious node forces legitimate nodes to waste their energy 
by resisting the sensor nodes from going into low power sleep mode. The target of this attack is to 
maximize the power consumption of the affected node, thereby decreasing its battery life. Existing works on 
sleep deprivation attack have mainly focused on mitigation using MAC based protocols, such as S-MAC 
(sensor MAC), T-MAC (timeout MAC),  B-MAC  (Berkley MAC), G-MAC ( gateway MAC). In this article, 
a brief review of some of the recent intrusion detection systems in wireless sensor network environment is 
presented. Finally, a framework of cluster based layered countermeasure for Insomnia Detection has been 
proposed for heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSNET) to efficiently detect sleep deprivation 
attack. Simulation results on MATLAB exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed model. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor network (WSNET) consists of low-cost, resource limited sensor nodes to sense 
data and to transmit it to distant sink node that acts as gateway to another network or access point 
for human interface. In reality, homogeneous sensor networks hardly exist. In heterogeneous 
sensor network, a large number of inexpensive nodes perform sensing, while a few nodes having 
comparatively more energy perform other tasks such as data filtering, transport. This leads to the 
research on heterogeneous wireless sensor network (HWSNET) where different types of nodes 
are considered to prolong the life-time and reliability of the network. HWSNET is a rapidly 
growing area in the real life applications like traffic, environment monitoring, healthcare, military 
applications, home automation, disaster monitoring.  
WSNET suffers from several drawbacks like limited energy, computation, and storage 
capabilities of sensor nodes. It is more vulnerable to various attacks due to its deployment in 
hostile environment where it is very difficult to change or recharge the batteries. A particularly 
devastating attack is the sleep deprivation attack, where a malicious node forces legitimate nodes 
to waste their energy by resisting the sensor nodes from going into low power sleep mode. In 
1999, Stajano and Anderson [10] first mentioned denial of sleep attack as “sleep deprivation 
torture”. The target of this attack is to maximize the power consumption of the affected node, 
thereby decreasing its battery life. This attack can nullify any energy savings obtained by 
allowing sensor nodes to enter into sleep mode. Sleep deprivation attack comes also in the form 
of sending traffic that causes a sleeping node to wake-up. This attack can nullify any energy 
savings obtained by allowing sensor nodes to enter into sleep mode.  This type of attack has the 
potential to lessen the lifetime of sensor nodes. It imposes such a large amount of energy 
consumption upon the limited power sensor nodes that they stop working. This gives rise to 
denial of service by violating wireless network connectivity. The attacker launches a sleep 
deprivation attack by interacting with the victim in a manner that appears to be legitimate. As a 
consequence, this attack is difficult to detect because it is assumed to be carried out through the 
use of seemingly innocent interactions. 
The typical IDS used in MANETs fail to provide power efficiency. Thus security solutions in 
WSNET have to be designed with efficient resource utilization, especially power. Existing works 
on sleep deprivation attack have mainly focused on mitigation using MAC based protocols, such 
as S-MAC (sensor MAC), T-MAC (timeout MAC), B-MAC (Berkley MAC), G-MAC (gateway 
MAC). But it may increase the overhead of security solution in terms of complexity and cost. 
Therefore the requirement is to found the alternative of MAC based protocols for detecting sleep 
deprivation attack. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the intrusion detection system 
and related technologies for WSNET. In section 3, an insight into ongoing research activities is 
presented. Section 4 consists of an outline of the proposed model. Chapter 5 illustrates the 
experimental results for performance analysis. It is followed by a conclusion in Section 6. 
 
2. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM FOR WSNET 
 An intrusion can be defined as a set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, 
confidentiality or availability of a resource. In general there are two major kinds of detection 
techniques, (i) anomaly detection, (ii) misuse detection. Anomaly detection technique detects 
unusual deviations from the normal behavior. The determination of threshold values for normal 
behavior becomes very important in this type of detection. This has high probability of false 
alarm rate because anomaly detection generally uses a defined model of normal behavior; a 
packet is determined to be abnormal by the system when the current behavior varies from the 
model of normal behavior. As a result, anomaly detection often classifies normal behavior as 
abnormal, leading to the problem of erroneous classification. However, it seldom marks an 
abnormal behavior as normal. Thus, detection system that can adaptively change the normal 
model is preferable. Anomaly detection properties that must be satisfied are – accuracy, 
responsiveness, resource usage, robustness. Misuse detection technique (signature based) 
compares patterns (signatures) of well-known attacks stored in profiles with the current scenario. 
This technique fails to detect unknown attack patterns. 
 Intrusion detection system (IDS) detects security violation on a system by monitoring and 
analyzing network activities, and raises an alarm when an intrusion occurs. The constraints 
inherent to sensor network, such as sparse resource and limited battery life, impose a restriction 
on how the detection tasks are performed. The nature of sensor networks necessitate that the 
efficient IDS must fulfill the following requirements: 
ü IDS must be able to detect the anomalies with considerable accuracy.  
ü Detection and responses to anomalies must be within acceptable time period. 
ü It must be capable of isolating intruders successfully in WSNET. 
ü IDS must be lightweight consuming less energy (minimal computing and battery) to 
extend WSNET life cycle. 
     In wireless sensor networks, IDS topology can be classified as follows:        
Ø Distributed approach: Intrusion detection load is divided among the sensor nodes, 
which may collaborate with each other to form a global intrusion detection mechanism. 
This architecture is more suitable for flat wireless sensor networks. 
Ø Hierarchical approach: This architecture has been proposed for multilayered wireless 
sensor network. In this approach, network is divided into clusters where cluster-heads 
aggregate data collected from the member nodes. At the same time all cluster-heads can 
cooperate with central base station to form a global IDS.     
    Most of the existing intrusion detection techniques have not met the requirements for practical 
deployment in wireless sensor network.  
3. RELATED WORKS  
This section presents a category-wise report of on-going research activities. IDS can be 
implemented using various techniques. Intrusion detection for WSN is an emerging field of 
research. 
In [1], a semantic based intrusion detection framework is proposed for WSN by using multi-agent 
and semantic based techniques, where security ontology is constructed according to the features 
of WSN to represent the formal semantics for intrusion detection. This distributed technique is 
based on cooperative mechanism. IDS framework includes the following layers: (1) network 
layer refers to the network topology of the WSN; (2) semantic layer refers to security ontology 
(formal semantics for WSN activities); (3) model layer refers to intrusion detection model 
(collection of rules for intrusion detection) for single sensor node. The model determines the 
behaviors of sensor nodes; (4) cooperative layer refers to the policy that how sensor nodes 
cooperate with each other for detecting intrusion. In this mechanism, each selected rule of 
security ontology is mapped to sensing data collected from common sensor nodes to detect 
anomaly. If result of intrusion detection by an agent node (monitor node that is only equipped 
with intrusion detection model) is undecidable then data is forwarded to a neighboring agent 
node. 
In [2], an energy efficient learning solution for IDS in WSN has been proposed. This schema is 
based on the concept of stochastic learning automata on packet sampling mechanism. Simple 
Learning Automata based ID (S-LAID) functions in a distributed manner with each node 
functioning independently without any knowledge about the adjacent nodes. System Budget (total 
sampling budget of a single node) is analogous to the amount of energy that the node can spend 
on intrusion detection during its lifetime and the balance budget of the system is analogous to the 
residual sampling energy of the system. Exhaustion of sampling budget of a node implies that no 
more energy can be spent on intrusion detection tasks. In S-LAID, each node continuously 
samples its interface at a minimum sampling budget. If malicious packets are found and the 
detection rate is more than the penalty threshold, then the sampling rate is increased by 
penalization function. When the detection rate is less than the penalty threshold, the sampling rate 
is decreased by reward function. The rate control algorithm is used to control the increment in the 
sampling rate. System checks whether it is profitable to increase the sampling budget to make 
sure that it works in energy efficient manner.  
In [3], a location-aware, trust-based detection and isolation mechanism of compromised nodes in 
wireless sensor network is proposed. In this technique, probabilistic model is used to define trust 
and reputation. After deployment, each node periodically broadcasts one-hop hello packets to 
discover its neighbors. If any node is verified to be authentic, it is recorded in its neighbors list 
and its trust value is initialized. Then a secure cluster formation algorithm is executed. The 
maintenance phase involves updating reputation, trust, and confidence metrics according to the 
modeling parameters. During this phase the nodes monitor the traffic coming in and out of their 
neighbors. The purpose of revocation is to remove dishonest nodes from the network. Each node 
periodically checks its trust table for detecting lowest trust metric. If the least trusted node also 
has a confidence value above a predetermined threshold then that node is blacklisted and its node 
id is broadcasted as being dishonest. If there is a tie then one of the least trusted nodes is 
randomly selected for broadcasting its id and it has to be decided whether this node need to be 
blacklisted or packet need to be dropped. 
In [4], a method using isolation tables is proposed to isolate malicious nodes by avoiding 
consumption of unnecessary energy by IDS (ITIDS).This hierarchical structure of IDS based on 
cluster network can detect serious attacks such as hello flooding, denial of service (DoS), denial 
of sleep, sinkhole and wormhole attack. In this model, load of PCH (primary cluster head) is 
distributed among number of SCHs (secondary cluster head) that can directly receive sensing data 
from each MN (member node) of MGs (Monitor Group).Base station receives sensing data and 
isolation tables from PCH whose responsibility is to gather sensing data and integrate isolation 
tables from SCH, which is selected randomly. SCHs calculate trust values to find malicious MNs 
(member nodes), isolate and record malicious nodes in its isolation table. MN can determine 
whether the PCH is intruder or not. In this mechanism, malicious nodes can be detected by 
considering remaining energy and trust values of sensor nodes.  
In [5], a lightweight ranger based IDS (RIDS) has been proposed. It combines the ranger method 
to reduce energy consumption and the isolation tables to avoid detecting anomaly repeatedly. 
This lightweight IDS model relates ontology concept mechanism about anomaly detection. In this 
technique, rough set theory (RST) is used for preprocessing of packets and anomaly models will 
be trained by support vector machine (SVM). Relationship between sensor node data and 
ontology concept is compared to detect attack. The ranger loads detection models for detecting 
anomaly and the error information will be recorded in isolation table of the base station. Different 
attack type modules are selected depending on environment of sensor network to establish 
lightweight IDS. Ontology is applied to construct relationship between nodes of WSN. The IDS 
calculates relationship of whole WSN to define relationship threshold.  
In [6], a hierarchical overlay design (HOD) based intrusion detection system is proposed, using 
policy based detection mechanism. This model follows core defense strategy where cluster-head 
is the centre point to defend intruder and concentrates on saving the power of sensor nodes by 
distributing the responsibility of intrusion detection to three layer nodes. Except leaf nodes, all 
intermediate nodes have high energy. Each area of sensor nodes is divided into hexagonal regions 
where sensor nodes are monitored by cluster node which is in turn monitored by regional node 
that is controlled and monitored by the base station. The HOD based IDS uses hybrid approach 
(misuse and anomaly) of intrusion detection mechanisms. The components of IDS for policy 
based management include (1) Base policy decision point (BPDP) is the controlling component 
of the architecture. It implements intrusion rules generated by the intrusion detection tool (IDT) 
from receiving events, evaluating anomaly conditions.(2) Local policy agents (LPAs) and 
regional policy agents (RPAs) act as policy decision modules (PDMs). LPA reduces management 
bandwidth and computational overhead from leaf level sensor nodes to improve network 
performance and intrusion detection efficiency. An RPA can manage multiple LPAs and BPDP 
manages and controls all the RPAs.(3) Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) are low level sensor 
nodes. In this technique, if regional node fails then base station can select one of its neighbor 
nodes dynamically according to some predefined rule in BPDP. Then BPDP needs to supply the 
policy, rules, or signatures of failed node to the selected new neighbor regional node. In the same 
way RPA has the only responsibility to select appropriate neighbor LPA. As base station is much 
more powerful node with large storage; all the signatures, anomaly detection rules or policies are 
stored primarily as backup in base station.  
In [8], a hierarchical model (three layer architecture) is proposed based on weighted trust 
evaluation (WTE) to detect malicious nodes by monitoring its reported data. It is a three layer 
architecture which consists of three types of sensor nodes: (1) Low-power, limited functionality 
sensor nodes (SN) that do not support multi-hop routing capability to its neighbor.(2) High-
power, trustful forwarding nodes (FN) that forward data obtained form sensor nodes to upper 
layer and offers multi-hop routing capability to SNs or other FNs.(3) Access points (AP) or base 
stations (BS) that route data between wireless networks and the wired infrastructure and 
considered to be trustful. This model considers only HELLO flooding attack, Sybil attack, 
blackhole attack, wormhole attack, DDoS attack. In this mechanism, FN collects all information 
provided by SNs and calculates an aggregation result (E) by using the weight (Wn ranging from 0 
to 1) assigned to each SN and sensor node’s output that may be true(alarm) or false(no alarm). If 
a sensor node is compromised and frequently sends its report inconsistent with the final decision, 
its weight is likely to be decreased. Based on updated weights, the forwarding node is able to 
detect a node as a malicious node if its weight is lower than a specific threshold. 
In [9], a dynamic model of intrusion detection (DIDS) has been proposed for WSN. This is a 
hierarchical model of IDS based on clustered network to battle the low energy. The components 
of IDS framework are an event monitor module for monitoring event data in its radio range, rule 
record base for storing rules to detect unauthorized access, alert for producing signal if intrusion 
is detected by IDS, a misuse detection module for generating alert for known attacks, anomaly 
detection module to generate alert for any generated anomaly. The IDS is pre-installed in every 
sensor node, and gets activated at specific times. If a node is found to consume more energy after 
activation of IDS, a cluster reconfiguration process is proposed for energy optimization. When 
number of detected intruders per unit time in a cluster is more than the threshold value, then the 
procedure upgrades the core defense and boundary defense mechanism to distributed defense 
mechanism (selecting agent node by voting algorithm) which has stronger detection capability. It 
can use distributed defense which has the advantage of detecting multiple intruders, albeit, with 
an increased rate of energy consumption with increase in cluster size.  
4. PROPOSED MODEL  
In this section, a lightweight, hierarchical model is proposed for heterogeneous wireless sensor 
network (HWSNET) to detect insomnia of sensor nodes affected by sleep deprivation attack. It 
uses cluster based mechanism in an energy efficient manner to build a five layer hierarchical 
network to enhance network scalability and lifetime. The low energy constraints of WSNET 
necessitate the use of a hierarchical model. Here sensor network is divided into clusters which are 
again partitioned into sectors. Partitioning the sensor field can conserve communication 
bandwidth and avoids redundant exchange of messages among sensor nodes. It can prolong the 
battery life of the individual sensors and the network lifetime and can reduce the rate of energy 
consumption. In this model, energy efficiency can be achieved by keeping a minimal number of 
sensors active. A dynamic model is designed here to overcome sudden death of IDS enabled 
sensor nodes which are responsible for all detection tasks, due to exhaustion of power. The 
proposed model uses anomaly detection technique in such a way so that phantom intrusion 
detection can be avoided.  
4.1 Assumptions  
Assumptions are necessary to define both the boundaries of this research and the scope of the 
problem. The following assumptions are taken in order to design the proposed model.  
 
o Different states of a sensor node:  
               NEW→MEMBER→ SUSPECTED→MALICIOUS→ISOLATED 
                                       ↓              ↕                         ↓ 
                                        GENUINE     →          DEAD 
o Every node has a unique id (geographical position vector) in the network. 
o Each member node has member-id and authentic wake-up coin. 
o A protocol is used to assign a secure optimal wakeup and sleep schedule for the sensor 
nodes. 
o Sink node is honest gateway to another network or access point.  
o Threshold values are pre-calculated and set for the entire network. 
o Timestamp must be included in each message during transmission through network. 
o SM may be more than one within a sector. 
o SN selects CC, SM, FSH and CC selects SC. 
 
4.2   System Model 
   
Figure 1      Layered Model 
Figure 1 describes the main building block of the system model. Here SN→SINK NODE; 
CC→CLUSTER COORDINATOR; SM→SECTOR MONITOR; FSH→FORWARDING 
SECTOR HEAD; SC→SECTOR COORDINATOR; LN→ LEAF NODE;  
4.3   Layers of System Model 
The five layers of proposed model are described below- 
Layer 1: In this lowest layer leaf nodes sense environmental data and send it to its immediate 
next higher layer i.e. layer 2. Layer 1 has no anomaly detection capacity. 
Layer 2: This layer includes sector coordinator (SC) of each sector. Sector coordinator maintains 
membership list [] → {node-id, member-id, node status, validity} of all leaf nodes within a 
sector, normal profile [] (tuple space that consists of sensor node’s attribute) and knowledge base 
[] (system parameters, application requirements), reputation list [] → {node-id, member-id, 
scount , ncount, trust, na, belief, reput}, suspected list [] → {node-id, member-id, na, monitor, 
trust ,scount ,Tot, suspected}.  
Layer 3: This layer includes sector monitor (SM) and forwarding sector head (FSH). Sector 
monitor maintains suspected list [], normal profile [], knowledge base [], reputation list [], 
quarantine list [] → {node-id, member-id, na, monitor, compromised, trust, scount, malicious}. 
FSH (nearest neighbor of cluster coordinator) acts as router that inserts valid packet details to 
forwarding table [] → {node-id, member-id, na, packet-id, node-info, next hop, timestamp}. 
Layer 4: This layer constitutes the cluster coordinator (CC) which controls SM and FSH of each 
sector within a cluster. It inserts valid packets details to valid list [] → { node-id , member-id, na, 
reputation} and forwards data to the sink node. Cluster coordinators (CC) can cooperate with 
each other to form global IDS.CC contains backup copy of its own cluster. 
Layer 5: The topmost layer is the sink node that collects data from lower layer and it acts as a 
gateway between sensor network and other networks or acts as access point. SN contains backup 
copies of all clusters. 
4.4 Data Definition 
Definition 1: Leaf Node LN– A node N is defined to be a Leaf Node if ChildN { }= {∅} AND 
ParentN   { } ≠ {∅}. Its detection power (DP) ←0 AND priority level← MIN_PRIORITY(5). 
Definition 2: Sector Coordinator SC – A node N is defined to be a Sector Coordinator if ChildN  { 
} ≠ {∅} AND ParentN { } ≠ {∅} AND  hop_distanceN = min{hop_ distance[FNi]  from CCk}, 
Rem_engN = MAX_ENG {FNE[i]}, where FNE[i] → remaining energy of follower nodes. Its 
priority level ← 4. 
Definition 3: Sector Monitor SM - A node N is defined to be a Sector Monitor if ChildN { } ≠ 
{∅} AND ParentN { } ≠ {∅} AND Rem_engN = MAX_ENG {LNE[i]}, where LNE[i] → 
remaining energy of all leader nodes excluding cluster coordinator, DPN = MAX_DETECT 
{N[i]}, where N∉ {CCk, SN} AND DPN→ power required for intrusion detection. Its priority 
level←3. 
Definition 4: Forwarding Sector Head FSH - A node N is defined to be a Forwarding Sector 
Head, ChildN{ } ≠ {∅} AND ParentN { } ≠ {∅} AND hop_distanceN = min{hop_ distance[i]  
from CCk},where N ∉CCk. Its detection power (DP) ←0 AND priority level ←3.    
Definition 5: Cluster Coordinator CC - A node N is defined to be a Cluster Coordinator, if 
ChildN{ } ≠ {∅} AND ParentN { } ≠ {∅} AND hop_distanceN = min{hop_ distance [LNi]  from 
SN}, where N ∉SN , Rem_engN = MAX_ENG {N[i]}. Its priority level←2. 
Definition 6: Sink Node SN - A node N is defined to be a Sink Node if ChildN { } ≠ {∅}   AND 
ParentN { } = {∅}. Its priority level←MAX_PRIORITY (1).    
4.5 Insomnia Detection Model 
The entire heterogeneous sensor field is divided into overlapping or disjoint clusters like Ck, for k 
∈ {1,..,r}, r being the number of clusters in the sensor network. Each cluster consists of its 
member nodes including a cluster coordinator. Let mem1, mem2, ....,memn be the members of a 
cluster Ck, and n is the number of members within a cluster excluding CC. Clusters are 
partitioned into non-overlapping sectors like Sj, for j∈{1,…,m},where m is the number of sectors 
within a cluster. Three types of sensor nodes are assumed in this five layered model: (i) leader 
nodes or LDN (in layer 3 and 4) (ii) follower nodes or FN (in layer 1 and 2) and (iii) sink node or 
SN (in layer 5). Leader nodes can be equipped with EXIDS (extended IDS), but only the node 
designated as sector monitor can activate it. Cluster coordinator (CC) and sink nodes (SN) are 
also using EXIDS for detecting intrusion during emergency. SN acts as controller and CC acts as 
assistant controller. SIDS (simple IDS) can be loaded in all follower nodes, but can be activated 
only at sector coordinator of layer 2 for detecting anomaly. Leaf nodes periodically generate data, 
possibly at different rates, for transfer to the sink node. Local timestamp is inserted in each 
packet. Sector coordinator collects sensing data within allotted time slot of each leaf node in a 
sector. A schedule assigns one or more time slots to each node. At time slot Ti the sector 
coordinator receives an acquisition vector av[i] and computes the probability of anomaly. Sector 
coordinator (SC) monitors the sensor nodes for detecting anomaly by SIDS. Suspected nodes are 
penalized and legitimate nodes are rewarded. Forwarding sector head (FSH) forwards valid 
packets to CC. Sector monitor (SM) decides whether a suspected node is malicious or not. 
EXIDS has the responsibility to declare the suspected node as malicious and to drop fake or 
corrupted packets. To avoid phantom intrusion detection logically, suspected nodes get chance to 
increase their reputation by SM, if it is not decided as malicious. Intruder or malicious nodes are 
isolated in quarantine list; so that no intrusion occurs through these nodes. 
When detection power reaches to minimum threshold, detection capacity is automatically 
disabled. Reconfiguration procedure takes place dynamically if any node found to be suspected 
i.e. energy consumption rate greater than normal consumption rate. Each of leader and follower 
nodes must be included within a cluster. If any node is under more than one CC, then its 
membership to the cluster is determined by checking that which CC can provide the strongest 
signal to that sensor node. If there is a tie, it is broken randomly. Anomaly is detected by SC. But 
there is a possibility of false positive or false negative. If any genuine node is suspected by SC 
(false positive), SM can detect it and takes final decision. If any compromised node is treated as 
genuine and forwarded to FSH (false negative), CC can detect it. SN selects cluster coordinator 
on the basis of leader node’s maximum current residual energy and minimum distance among all 
other nodes and coverage area of CC is considered as cluster. Then CC selects SC on the basis of 
follower node’s maximum current residual energy and minimum distance among all follower 
nodes. The coverage area of SC is considered as sector. Sector monitor within a sector is selected 
on the basis of its maximum current residual energy and detection power. FSH is selected on the 
basis of minimum distance from CC. 
4.6 Procedural Steps  
  The proposed model can work according to the following steps: 
§ Initialization Phase: Sensor nodes are deployed in the sensor field during this phase. A 
unique identification number consisting of the geographical position vectors is assigned to 
each new node. The sink node searches for its neighbors to acquire energy details of all nodes 
after broadcasting advertised message. 
§ Cluster Coordinator Selection and Cluster Formation Phase:  Cluster coordinator is 
selected among all leader nodes and its coverage area is considered as cluster. The Cluster-
head details are broadcasted to all its neighbors. The neighbor nodes collect advertised 
messages during a given time interval and send a join message to nearest cluster coordinator 
for all nodes within the range of any specific cluster coordinator. Intersection of domains of 
two clusters may or may not be NULL. 
§ Sector Coordinator Selection and Sector Formation Phase: Sector coordinator is selected 
among all follower nodes and its detailed information along with node-id is broadcasted to all 
of its neighbors. Its coverage area is considered as sector. Intersection  of domains of two 
sectors must be NULL. Sector monitors and forwarding sector heads are selected for each 
sector.  
§ IDS Activation Phase: Activate IDS preinstalled in cluster coordinators, sector monitors and 
sector coordinators. 
§ Reconfiguration Phase: When cluster coordinator or sector coordinator’s behavior deviates 
from normal, reconfiguration procedure takes place. 
§ Data Transfer and Intrusion Detection Phase: After sector coordinator selection is done 
each follower node (leaf node) sends data to the sector coordinator that transfers genuine 
packet to its cluster coordinator through forwarding sector head. Cluster coordinator collects 
valid data from all sectors within its coverage area and then forwards aggregated packets to 
sink node. 
4.7 Detection System of  Proposed Model   
The proposed model contains detection system consisting of two layers: i) SIDS; ii) EXIDS. 
SIDS: First Layer of IDS 
             Simple Intrusion Detection system can only capable of detecting anomaly and generating alert for 
suspected node. Although it consumes less power in detection, it may give rise to phantom 
detection.  
               
         
 
 
                                                      Figure 2          SIDS Model 
EXIDS: Second Layer of IDS  
Extended Intrusion Detection system can take final decision of intrusion detection. Features of 
SIDS are extended here. It consumes more power in detection, but it can reduce phantom 
intrusion detection. 
                           
               
 
                                                                Figure 3    EXIDS Model 
 
 
Table 1.  Terminologies used in Proposed Model 
 
Term Meaning 
pijk Packet sent by i
th leaf node of sector j of cluster k 
LNijk i
th leaf node of sector j of cluster k 
Ti Time-slot allocated to i
th leaf node 
insomnia Result of anomaly detection 
Lijk Standard battery lifetimeof  i
th leaf node of sector j of cluster k 
PWijk Initial battery power of  i
th leaf node of sector j of cluster k 
REijk Residual energy of i
th node of sector j of cluster k 
CRLTijk Calculated remaining lifetimeof i
th node of sector j of cluster k 
LREijk Last recorded energy of i
th node of sector j of cluster k 
Totijk Total number of packets sent by i
th leaf node of sector j of cluster k 
NP[] Normal profile 
KB[] Knowledge base 
Rsuspected Rate of energy consumption for suspected node 
Truedetect Count the number of times system detects true intrusion 
Phantomdetect Count the number of times system detects false intrusion 
 
System Parameters   
PWslp → power required in sleep mode; PWtr → power required during transmission; PWidle 
→power required in idle mode; PWwake→ power required in wakeup mode; PWcomp →power 
required during computation; PWsensing → power required during sensing data; Tidle→ time spent in 
idle mode; Tslp→ time spent in sleep mode; Ttr→time spent during transmission; Tcomp →time 
spent in computation; Twake→ wakeup duration; Tsensing →sensing duration; NECijk→ normal 
energy consumption; TNECijk → threshold normal energy consumption; ThLijk→ threshold 
lifetime; ThTwk→threshold wakeup duration; ThTsl→ threshold sleep duration; Thbuf →threshold 
buffer capacity; AWCijk →authentic wake up coin value; Tscount →threshold of allowable 
suspected count; Tper→ threshold of allowable suspected count percent; Treput → threshold 
reputation; Th →threshold value 
4.7 Insomnia Detection Procedure 
Begin 
Case 1: /* Energy consumption rate of any node found to be more compared to preset  
              threshold value of normal energy consumption or calculated lifetime of any node  
              found to be less compared to preset threshold lifetime of the node*/ 
 
     If  ECijk  > TNEC
i
jk  OR  CLT
i
jk < THL
i
jk  then 
                  insomnia ←1 
     Else 
                  insomnia  ←0 
     EndIf     
Case 2: /* Allotted wakeup period of any node is greater than predefined threshold  
                 wakeup schedule and allotted sleeping period is less than predefined threshold  
                 sleeping schedule*/ 
 
       If  Twake > ThTwk  AND Tslp< ThTsl  OR Tslp= 0 then 
                 insomnia ←1 
       Else 
                 insomnia  ←0 
  
       EndIf                
Case 3: /* Any node sends packets in a time-slot, but that slot is not allocated to that node*/ 
 
     If  | Tslot
i
jk -T
i
 | >0 then        // Tslot
i
jk → data actually transmitted by LN
i
jk during this time-slot 
                insomnia  ←1 
 
     Else 
                insomnia  ←0 
  
     EndIf 
Case 4: /* Residual energy of any node is found to vary more compared to last recorded  
               energy*/  
 
          If LREijk>> RE
i
jk OR  LRE
i
jk<< RE
i
jk then 
                     insomnia  ←1 
 
          Else 
                     insomnia  ←0 
          EndIf 
Case 5:  /*Received packets within a time interval exceeds pre-defined threshold value*/ 
 
            If  (Totijk / T
i )*100% > Thbuf  then 
                              insomnia  ←1 
            Else 
                    insomnia  ←0 
            EndIf 
  End Case          
End 
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, the analysis of proposed model is validated using MATLAB 7.0. Performance has 
been studied for existing ITIDS and proposed model. In figure 4, the result shows that, number of 
alive nodes with respect to increasing time in second is more in proposed model. Therefore it can 
be said that our HWSNET lifetime is better than ITIDS. Because proposed model uses dynamic 
configuration and cluster is further partitioned into sectors. In figure 5, the result shows that 
accuracy is comparatively high in proposed model because here sector monitors which have high 
detection power are used to detect intrusion; whereas in ITIDS low energy member nodes are 
considered as monitor nodes. In figure 6, energy consumption is compared with respect to the 
density of sensor nodes with clusterization and sectorization and without clusterization or 
sectorization. The result shows energy consumption is comparatively less when sensor field is 
partitioned into clusters and sectors.  In figure 7, result shows that packet transmission overhead 
increases with time. After analyzing performance, it can be said that proposed model can prolong 
network lifetime, detect intrusion accurately with less delay and consumes less energy to detect 
sleep deprivation attack. 
 
 
 
 Figure 4 Comparison of Number of Alive Nodes Between ITIDS and Proposed Model 
 
    Figure 5     Comparison of Accuracy between ITIDS and Proposed Model 
 
      
 
             Figure 6   Energy Consumption with Sectorization and without Sectorization in Proposed  
                              Model 
  
 
 
          Figure 7   Packet Transmission Overhead with respect to Time in Second 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Among the different types of prevalent attacks, sleep deprivation attack at link layer has been 
found to be the most devastating one for sensor nodes, exhausting the battery life very quickly. 
This paper comes up with the idea of a novel model that can detect sleep deprivation attack 
without using MAC based protocols like S-MAC, T-MAC, B-MAC, G-MAC. The outline of 
layer based approach using cluster technique to design a lightweight detection model capable of 
detecting insomnia of sensor nodes with less energy consumption has been documented here. The 
aim of this proposed model is to extend the lifetime of the HWSNET, even in the face of sleep 
deprivation attack. Generally, intruder attacks lower layer leaf nodes in HWSNET. In this article, 
insomnia detection is mainly focused on layer 1 that has no detection capacity of its own. More 
studies are being done to analyze the performance of the proposed model with respect to other 
considerable parameters such as energy consumption rate, delay, accuracy in presence of multiple 
intruders and can be compared with other existing models. 
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